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How might bounded rationality shape decisions to spend? A ﬁeld experiment ver-
iﬁes a theory of bounded rationality as deliberation costs that can explain ﬁndings
from previous experiments on pricing in developing countries. The model predicts that
(1) eliminating deliberation costs will increase purchasing at a higher price without
impacting behavior at a lower price, (2) bounded rationality has certain greater eﬀects
on poorer people, and (3) deliberation costs can suppress screening by prices. Each
prediction is conﬁrmed by an experiment that sold soap in rural Indian villages. The
experiment interacted assignment to diﬀerent subsidized prices with a treatment that
eliminated marginal deliberation costs. The results suggest implications of bounded
rationality for theory and social policy.
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11 Introduction
Many economists suspect people are boundedly rational: “intentionally rational, but lim-
itedly so” (Simon, 1957). Behavior, intuition, and the continuing attraction to modeling
bounded rationality all support this view (Kreps, 1990; Conlisk, 1996; Rubinstein, 1998).
I oﬀer experimental evidence that a particular model of bounded rationality – rather than
maximized standard or behavioral preferences – explains important economic behavior.
How do people, especially poor people, decide whether to spend their money? Evidence
from several ﬁeld experiments in development economics indicates that even for important
investments in human capital, and even at very low prices, behavior is very sensitive to small
changes in price (Holla and Kremer, 2009). Yet, Holla and Kremer, along with Deaton (2009)
and Rodrik (2008), recognize that these ﬁndings would be most useful for policy-making with
a theory that clariﬁes their causes and domain.
One such theory is bounded rationality as deliberation costs. In the model I present,
a boundedly rational agent will only make a suﬃciently expensive purchase after careful
consideration, but this consideration is costly. To a suﬃciently poor person, even small prices
can be large enough to require deliberation. Thus, deliberation costs (1) will encourage
sensitivity to small prices as found in prior ﬁeld experiments, (2) will have certain larger
eﬀects on poorer agents, and (3) can prevent prices from targeting products to users with
high value. The model formalizes Bertrand, Mullainathan and Shaﬁr’s (2005) intuition that
bounded rationality may have diﬀerent consequences for poor and rich people.
The theory is tested by a social marketing or cost sharing ﬁeld experiment in Kutch,
a rural district of Gujarat, India. In the experiment, some participants answered survey
questions designed to require them to deliberate, leaving zero marginal deliberation costs at
the time of the decision without otherwise inﬂuencing demand. Eliminating marginal delib-
eration costs reduces sensitivity to small prices in the way the model predicts. In addition
to conﬁrming further predictions of the theory and disconﬁrming alternative explanations,
the experiment suggests that “economic” and “psychological” variables do not operate in
isolation: prices and deliberation costs interact.
1.1 Bounded rationality
“Bounded rationality” is given many meanings, and sometimes merely used synonymously
with “behavioral economics.” By bounded rationality I mean failure to maximize expected
utility over ﬁnal outcomes, out of available options. Therefore I exclude both non-standard
preferences—such as present bias, social preferences, anticipatory utility, motivated belief, or
2ambiguity aversion—and incomplete information, both of which are commonly incorporated
into models in which agents rationally optimize in expectation.
Conlisk (1996) reviews extensive evidence that people act without optimizing over ﬁnal
outcomes, but also identiﬁes obstacles to theorizing about such behavior. This essay’s the-
ory oﬀers a tractable model of bounded rationality that makes substantive predictions for
observable behavior. It combines two theoretical elements with many antecedents: choice
among decision-making strategies and deliberation costs. Agents optimize only as much as
is justiﬁed; it is a model of “optimal imperfection” (Baumol and Quandt, 1964).
Agents select the strategy that oﬀers the best expected result, net of deliberation costs;
therefore, they might not optimize expected utility over available ﬁnal outcomes. A recent
predecessor is Ergin’s (2003) representation of selection of future choice sets by agents who
only understand their preferences over ultimate options after costly contemplation. Like
Ergin’s, and as Conlisk anticipates, in technique my model resembles one of an agent opti-
mally gathering information: “The similarity of information-gathering and deliberation, as
joint inputs in producing a decision, suggests that models of deliberation, as they evolve
in economics, will inevitably have a general resemblance to existing models of information
collection” (690). Yet, agents acquire no new information; they process what they know to
arrive at a more deliberative conclusion—or they do not.
1.2 Pricing for the poor
“Social marketing” programs sell products and services to poor people. Many programs
adopt techniques from for-proﬁt ﬁrms, and often products are partially subsidized. Social
marketing is also known as “cost sharing”: by charging, governments or NGOs share the cost
of an intervention with recipients, potentially making programs more ﬁnancially sustainable.
Holla and Kremer (2009) review prior ﬁeld experiments with social marketing. Across
several studies, they ﬁnd two stylized facts:
• Small price increases, even at highly subsidized prices, have large eﬀects: “imposing
small costs consistently leads to dramatic reductions in take-up.” Some studies oﬀer
“evidence the behavior is particularly sensitive to price at prices close to zero.”
• Charging user fees does not “target [a product] to households that could beneﬁt from
it the most.” In general, purchased products are not more likely to be used by the
most vulnerable than products accepted for free.
Kremer and Miguel (2007), studying school-based deworming in Kenya, ﬁnd that charging an
average of thirty cents per child, rather than distributing medicine for free, reduces take-up
3by 82 percent without targeting it to infected children. Ashraf, Berry and Shapiro’s (2007)
experimental marketing of water disinfectant door-to-door in Zambia found large eﬀects of
price on purchasing. Yet buyers at high prices were no more likely to be pregnant or have
children under ﬁve than people who accepted disinfectant for lower prices. Cohen and Dupas
(2007) experimentally sold insecticide-treated bednets in Kenyan antenatal clinics. Charging
sixty cents reduced take-up by 60 percent relative to free distribution; recipients who paid
were no more anemic than recipients who did not.
Though not social marketing, Shampanier, Mazar and Ariely (2007) sold discounted or
gave free chocolate to MIT students. They oﬀer a choice between low and high quality
chocolates for either 1 or 26 cents or 0 or 25 cents; “in the zero-price condition, dramatically
more participants choose the cheaper option.” They explain their ﬁndings with “aﬀect”:
being free oﬀers an emotional utility bonus. Their evidence, a separate “forced analysis”
treatment arguably requiring participants to pay deliberation costs, eliminates the special
eﬀect of a zero price. In their experiments Shampanier et al. oﬀer two prices to the same
subject; this within-subject design is unable to distinguish bounded rationality from aﬀect.
By varying prices across subjects, the experiment in section 3 will be able to isolate the eﬀect
of deliberation costs.
This essay’s experiment, which interacts prices with a deliberation treatment, is econo-
metrically similar to Dupas’ (2009) further investigation of pricing for bednets. Dupas inter-
acted randomly assigned prices with “two interventions based on behavioral models designed
from psychology:” being asked to make a “verbal commitment” to buying the bednet and
receiving a “marketing message.” Neither treatment statistically signiﬁcantly interacted
with prices. The experiment in section 3 diﬀers from Dupas’ study in that it speciﬁcally
avoids manipulating participants’ utility for the product and that it emphasizes cognitive,
not social, mechanisms.
The theory in section 2 oﬀers bounded rationality as one explanation for the ﬁndings of
these experiments. Consumer behavior is complex, and these results are surely shaped by
many factors. For example, Dupas (2009) ﬁnds lower price elasticity than in previous exper-
iments; this is perhaps because participants had three months to redeem their coupons for
bednets, potentially overcoming credit constraints. However, among many possible comple-
mentary explanations of these prior experiments, this essay’s experiment indicates bounded
rationality should be included.
41.3 Handwashing with soap
Diarrheal disease kills many children in poor countries. Handwashing with soap protects
against diarrheal disease. Because “the eﬀectiveness of handwashing and point-of-use water
treatment has been well established,” Zwane and Kremer (2007) argue that “attention should
now be given to eﬀorts to understand eﬀective promotion strategies and how to sustain
behavior change” (7). How can people be encouraged to acquire and use soap?
One popular answer is selling soap speciﬁcally to the poor.1 Easterly (2006) recounts
the tale of Lifebuoy Swasthya Chetna, the social marketing program that resulted when
Hindustan Lever Limited “realized [they] could ﬁnd a larger market if they were tied to
preventing diarrheal diseases for the poor” (12). As Neath (2006), Unilever’s Senior Vice
President for Global Corporate Responsibility, observes, “getting people to understand the
need for handwashing is one thing, persuading them to buy a bar of soap is another.” Unlike
the social marketing programs surveyed by Holla and Kremer, Swasthya Chetna did not
subsidize soap. “To help people on low incomes a small 18gm bar of Lifebuoy has been
introduced... this sells for the equivalent of 2 rupees.” At 0.111 rupees per gram, this soap
cost more than the regular bars of Lifebuoy soap I found in Kucchi villages (table 4).
In this essay’s ﬁeld experiment in Kutch, surveyors sold packages of Lifebuoy soap door-
to-door at two experimentally varied, discounted prices. Random assignment to either a
low or a very low price of soap was interacted with assignment to a control group or a
treatment group in which marginal deliberation costs are eliminated. What appeared to be
survey questions actually required treatment group participants to contemplate the oﬀer.
The theory predicts, and the model ﬁnds, that the treatment promotes buying only at the
higher price. This eﬀect is greater for poorer participants, and only without deliberation
costs does a higher price concentrate adoption on participants with greater need.
2 Theory
I model bounded rationality as deliberation costs. A boundedly rational agent is unsure
whether an oﬀer is worth accepting; despite full information, she cannot automatically rec-
ognize which behavior is optimal. She can compute with certainty whether or not accepting
the oﬀer would maximize her expected utility by paying a utility cost of thinking. If she
does not consider the oﬀer carefully she does not pay the deliberation cost, but runs the
1Advocates of social marketing contend that charging makes programs “sustainable.” Yet, Kremer and
Miguel (2007) explain that sustainability may be a misplaced ideal: the social value of human capital
investments with positive externalities may substantially exceed private willingness to pay. Soap, which
diminishes disease transmission, has such externalities (Luby et al., 2004).
5risk of making a wasteful purchase. When made an oﬀer, she chooses among deliberating,
accepting without deliberation, and rejecting without deliberation.2
This model is stylized. It isolates one agent and one decision, ignoring markets and
time. While generalizing decision-making to include selecting a strategy to decide, it ignores
higher-level strategies (how to decide how to decide...) that may inﬁnitely regress. These
abstractions permit a tractable model with veriﬁable predictions.
2.1 Model
An agent must decide whether to accept an oﬀer to buy a good at a price. If she accepts,
she pays a price p and receives utility ˜ x. She decides by comparing the expected utility of
the good with the opportunity cost of spending p, which depends on her wealth w and her
concave, increasing utility for wealth u(·). Is E[˜ x] > u(w) − u(w − p)?
However, she is boundedly rational: she only understands the utility consequences of
accepting an oﬀer after costly deliberation. I consider two formal frameworks for bounded
rationality with almost identical behavioral consequences and with identical implications for
the experiment. In one interpretation the agent knows the utility from the oﬀer, ˜ x, only after
deliberating; for example, a villager considering soap could remember her children’s recent
diarrhea, assess whether members of her family would use the soap, and compute how long
an unusually large package would last relative to other oﬀers at other prices. In the other
interpretation the agent knows the marginal disutility of spending p only after deliberating;
thus she might consider future demands on her money, who in her household will spend the
money if she does does not, and the cost of otherwise fulﬁlling the same needs.
In either case, the agent observes initial signals x and u(·), ﬁrst impressions about the
quality of the oﬀer or her utility for wealth which may not be trustworthy. Only by paying
an additive utility cost of deliberation, c > 0, can the agent ﬁgure out the true values.
If bounded rationality is interpreted to be about the good, ˜ x, her uncertainty is simple:
with probability π ∈ [0,1] the oﬀer is as good as it seems and ˜ x = x, but with probability
1 − π the good is worthless to her and ˜ x = 0; u(·) is correct. If she is boundedly rational
about the marginal utility of money then x = ˜ x, but only with probability π is u(·) her
utility for wealth; with probability 1 − π it is λu(·), where λ is a multiplier greater than
one. In either interpretation, she has three options: buy without deliberating, reject the
oﬀer without deliberating, or think and then buy only if her signal is correct. Ex ante, these
2This is an example of what Conlisk (1996) calls an “F(P) problem.” P is the problem of selecting a
behavior; F(P) asks how to solve it given deliberation costs. Thus, if X is a behavior, Π(·) maps behaviors
to proﬁts, T is a quantity of thinking, and C is a per-unit deliberation cost, P requires agents to “choose X
to make Π(X) large,” while F(P) asks they “choose T to make E{Π[X(T)]} − CT large” (689).
6Table 1: Three strategies, two interpretations
bounded rationality concerns: the oﬀer x utility for wealth u(·)
buy without deliberating πx + u(w − p) x + [π + (1 − π)λ]u(w − p)
deliberate before buying π[x + u(w − p)] π[x + u(w − p)]
+(1 − π)u(w) − c +(1 − π)λu(w) − c
reject without deliberating u(w) [π + (1 − π)λ]u(w)
three options oﬀer the expected utilities in table 1.
Which strategy will the agent pursue? If the agent were perfectly rational, with c = 0,
she would deliberate about each good that she might buy. She would consider every oﬀer
with x > v(p,w), where v(p,w) = u(w) − u(w − p), the opportunity cost of spending p at
wealth w. Because of the concavity of u,
vp > 0,vw < 0, and vpw < 0.3
This deﬁnes a threshold: a perfectly rational agent deliberates if x > ¯ x(p,w) ≡ v(p,w) and
buys if she ﬁnds accepting oﬀers positive net utility.
However, the agent is not perfectly rational, and must decide whether to think. She
prefers buying without thinking to rejecting the oﬀer without thinking if and only if
x > ¯ x
NT(p,w) ≡ γv(p,w). (1)
The multiplier γ > 1 establishes distance between ¯ xNT and ¯ x that is increasing in p.4 Both
thresholds are zero when price is — any good with the possibility of value is worth accepting
for free — but the minimum value required to buy unthinkingly increases in price more
quickly than does the minimum value for a perfectly rational agent. This conservatism is an
implication of Spence and Zeckhauser’s (1972) demonstration that “requiring an individual
to make consumption decisions... before a lottery is resolved will make him substantially
more eager to face a lottery which... oﬀers little variance” (402).
For thinking to be optimal, the beneﬁts of thinking must outweigh the deliberation costs.
If the agent deliberates she will only pay p if the good is valuable, but she pays c whether
3Additionally, vpp > 0, but, because x and u are together unique only up to a positive transformation,
this has no revealed preference implications.
4When bounded rationality concerns x, γ = 1
π; when it concerns the utility of wealth, γ = π + (1 − π)λ.
7or not she decides to buy. She prefers thinking to preemptive rejection if and only if
x > ¯ x




The signal x must exceed the value of the price by enough to compensate for deliberating: it
would not be worth thinking to buy a good only slightly better than its price. The minimum
signal ¯ xT is increasing in price at the same rate as ¯ x but additionally requires c
π at the origin.
Whether costly deliberation is preferable to simply buying the good depends on the utility
at stake in the risk of wasting money and on the costs of thinking. Deliberation is preferred





Let ¯ xBR(p,w) indicate the minimum signal x above which a boundedly rational agent will
either purchase or consider purchasing the good at price p; below this cutoﬀ, a boundedly
rational agent does not buy the good.
Proposition 1. There is a price cutoﬀ p∗(c,w,π,γ), below which the agent will only buy the
good if its signal merits buying without deliberation, and only above which will she deliberate




¯ xNT(p,w) p ≤ p∗
¯ xT(p,w) p > p∗ . (4)
The existence of p∗ follows directly from condition 3. The shape of ¯ xBR results from the
combination of conditions 1, 2, and 3.
Figure 1 depicts the agent’s buying behavior. The threshold that determines behavior,
¯ xBR, is indicated by the heavy line. The shaded area between ¯ x and ¯ xBR is the set of poten-
tially proﬁtable oﬀers forgone due to deliberation costs. These are oﬀers that an unboundedly
rational agent would consider and that may oﬀer more utility than the opportunity cost of
their price, but that the boundedly rational agent will not consider or accept.
The sensitivity to small prices highlighted by Holla and Kremer’s review of pricing ﬁeld
experiments may be due to the ignored oﬀers between ¯ x and ¯ xBR: free goods are not aﬀected
by deliberation costs but oﬀers for sale are. Especially at the low prices these experiments
5When bounded rationality concerns x, deliberation is preferred if and only if condition 3 holds. When
bounded rationality concerns u(·), deliberation is preferred to buying outright if and only if 3 holds and
x < λv(p,w) − c
1−π; if the good is suﬃciently valuable sparing deliberation costs could be worth the risk.
This third threshold also intersects ¯ xNT and ¯ xT at p∗.
8emphasize, the boundedly and unboundedly rational thresholds are diverging steeply; above
p∗ they remain separated by c
π.
2.2 Comparative statics
2.2.1 Eliminating deliberation costs
The ﬁeld experiment in section 3 requires some participants to deliberate about a purchase,
reducing marginal deliberation costs at the time of the decision to zero. What eﬀects does
this model predict of a change from c > 0 to c = 0?
If c = 0 then condition 3 is satisﬁed whenever p > 0 and π < 1: thinking is preferred to
simply buying whenever money is at stake, as long as there is some possibility of the oﬀer
not being valuable. Because c
π = 0, ¯ xBR collapses to ¯ x and the agent considers each oﬀer
that, if valuable, would be worth more than the opportunity cost of its price.
As ﬁgure 2 depicts, this has a ﬁrst order and a second order eﬀect. The ﬁrst order
eﬀect is to cause all potentially proﬁtable oﬀers to be considered, eliminating the shaded
area. Therefore, in the ﬁgure, the good would be considered at the higher price ph only
after deliberation costs have been reduced. If x > ¯ xBR(p,w) there is no ﬁrst order eﬀect;
depending on the distribution of x, meeting this threshold may be more likely at low prices,
where the set of foregone oﬀers occupies a shorter range of signals.
The second order eﬀect impacts some oﬀers that are accepted with deliberation costs.
Accepted oﬀers with p > p∗ were carefully considered and bought because, to illustrate with
the case of bounded rationality about the good, ˜ x = x. Accepted oﬀers with p < p∗ will only
now be deliberated about, however, and a fraction 1 − π will no longer be purchased when
˜ x is revealed to be zero. Therefore, at p` there would be no ﬁrst order eﬀect of eliminating
c, but the probability of acceptance will fall by 1 − π.
Proposition 2. Changing c > 0 to c0 = 0 eliminates the set of proﬁtable oﬀers foregone due
to bounded rationality.
• There is no ﬁrst order eﬀect inducing purchasing if the agent would buy the good at
c > 0.
• The width of the range of signals x in which changing c to 0 induces purchasing is
weakly increasing in p, and strictly increasing when p is small.
• If the agent would buy the good at c > 0 and only if p < p∗ then changing c to 0 has a
second order eﬀect of reducing the probability of acceptance by 1 − π.
92.2.2 Wealth
How do richer agents, with higher w, compare to poorer agents? Figure 3 presents a rep-
resentative illustration. Richer agents can aﬀord to think less about consumption. Their
opportunity cost of money v(p,w) is lower and increasing less quickly.
Proposition 3. For any u, π, and c:
•
∂p∗
∂w > 0: Deliberation is required to make a purchase at lower prices for poorer agents
than for richer agents.
• ∂L
∂w < 0: The area of the set of potentially proﬁtable oﬀers ignored is smaller for richer
agents.
A proof is presented in appendix section A.1.
Thus, if a richer agent who accepts an oﬀer deliberates, a poorer agent who accepts the
same oﬀer also deliberates. The ultimate consequences for buying behavior depend on the
equilibrium distribution of oﬀers (x,p) to poor and rich agents: in practice poor and rich
people buy and are oﬀered diﬀerent goods. A rich person with a high p∗ may pay more
deliberation costs than a poor person with a low p∗ if, for example, the rich person receives
more oﬀers, or if the oﬀers are suﬃciently expensive that the poor agent would not buy
them even without deliberation costs. Oﬀers made by social marketing programs are made
to the poor and carry low prices; proposition 3 suggests that in precisely these situations
deliberation costs will tax the poor most.
2.2.3 Skepticism and deliberation costs
How does behavior change after continuous changes in c and π? “Behavioral” outcomes are
often taken to be negligible when their causes are “small.” This section formalizes that this
intuition holds in the case of deliberation costs.
Proposition 4. As deliberation costs and uncertainty become small, buying behavior con-
verges to the unboundedly rational case.
•
∂p∗
∂c > 0: Higher deliberation costs encourage buying without thinking.
•
∂p∗
∂π > 0, when bounded rationality concerns x: Greater certainty encourages buying
without thinking.
• As c → 0, ¯ xBR(p,w) converges uniformly to ¯ x(p,w) for all w.
10• As π → 1, ¯ xBR(p,w) converges pointwise to ¯ x(p,w) for all w.
A proof is presented in appendix section A.2.
These asymptotically similar results have diﬀerent intermediate implications for delibera-
tion. To illustrate with the case where bounded rationality concerns x, as c goes to zero, the
agent approaches always deliberating; therefore she always pays (ever smaller) deliberation
costs and does not buy the fraction 1−π of goods that are worthless. As π goes to one, the
agent approaches never deliberating; she never pays the unchanging, positive deliberation
costs but does buy some goods — in ever smaller frequency — that are worthless. In the
limit in both cases the agent pays no deliberation costs (because there are not any, or because
she does not pay them) and purchases no worthless products (because she identiﬁes them
all, or because there are not any).
2.3 Deliberation costs and screening
Holla and Kremer observe that “advocates of charging [for education and health services and
products]... note that charging may screen out those who place low value on the product
or service, thus concentrating take-up on those who value it most.” If so, charging could
make distribution programs more eﬀective: a higher fraction of resources are used where
they would be most valuable.
However, the experiments Holla and Kremer summarize ﬁnd no evidence of higher prices
“targeting” products to those who would value them more. While this could occur among
perfectly rational consumers, especially if those with the highest value for the good are also
the poorest, deliberation costs can generate or exacerbate a failure of prices to target even
if the distribution of x is independent of wealth. No theorem is available—any particular
outcome depends on the distribution of x—but plausibly general implications of this model
for cross-sections of agents suggest that higher prices will often better target adoption to
those with higher value when there are no deliberation costs.
Deliberation costs raise ¯ xBR above ¯ x, requiring higher perceived value x at every price.
Proposition 3 demonstrated that this increased requirement, and its sacriﬁce of potentially
proﬁtable oﬀers, is greater for poorer agents. Yet, it is exactly the poor for whom the
diﬀerence between two prices—particularly the small prices studied in the social marketing
ﬁeld experiments—would be most relevant and most likely to screen out agents with higher
values.
Deliberation costs are most likely to prevent poorer agents from considering or accepting
an oﬀer. Yet, poorer agents are most likely to be sensitive to price, such that price separates
values x. Therefore, deliberation costs can suppress a screening eﬀect of higher prices.
11Table 2: Deliberation costs and screening
poor middle rich count xh %
c > 0 ph xh X 1
xl X 1
2 50%
pl xh X X 2
xl X X 2
4 50%
c = 0 ph xh X X X 3
xl X X 2
5 60%
pl xh X X X 3
xl X X X 3
6 50%
Table 2 illustrates this possibility with an example designed to explain the results of the
ﬁeld experiment in section 3. Wealth w and value x are jointly uniformly distributed. Agents
are either poor, middle, or rich, with wp < wm < wr and have either high or low private
value for a good, x` < xh. To emphasize: poor and rich agents experience the same cognitive
costs and have the same distribution of value. The table summarizes who buys when the six
agents are oﬀered the good in each of four situations: at a high or low price, p` < ph, and
with or without deliberation costs, c > 0 and c = 0.
Rich agents have suﬃciently low v(p,w) that, with x` or xh, they buy the product at
either price, even under deliberation costs. All middle agents are like those depicted in ﬁgure
2: with deliberation costs they buy the good at p` but at ph they reject the oﬀer, which falls
into their region of missed proﬁtable oﬀers. Without deliberation costs there is no such
region and they buy the product at either price, even with the lower value for the good.
Poorer agents are as in ﬁgure 4. Without deliberation costs, the higher price would
screen out agents with value x` while retaining agents with value xh. With deliberation
costs, neither type considers nor buys the good.
The outcomes where c > 0 correspond to the experiments summarized by Holla and
Kremer. There is a large eﬀect of the increase in price on the number of people buying the
good, but no eﬀect on the proportion of those who buy who have xh. Where c = 0, the eﬀect
of price on acceptance of the oﬀer is smaller and an increase in price increases the fraction
of buyers having higher value for the good.
123 Field experiment
The theory in section 2 argued that bounded rationality can cause small prices to have large
eﬀects on oﬀer acceptance and will cause potentially proﬁtable oﬀers to be ignored, especially
among the poor. Moreover, deliberation costs can prevent prices from sorting recipients by
their value for the product.
An experiment in rural villages in Kutch, India tested these predictions with door-to-
door sales of hand and body soap at two randomly assigned prices. The ﬁndings of the prior
pricing experiments surveyed by Holla and Kremer all occurred in the context of whatever
positive deliberation costs were independently present. The experiment in Kutch replicates
these ﬁndings in a control group with deliberation costs. To test whether bounded rational-
ity explains these results, in a treatment group marginal deliberation costs at the time of
the decision were manipulated to be zero. Thus, assignment to high or low prices was ex-
perimentally crossed with deliberation treatments to create four experimental groups. Each
participant was randomly assigned to one group. The results matched the theory.
3.1 Procedure
3.1.1 Context
In March and April 2009, surveyors visited 13 rural villages6 in Kutch, the largest district in
Gujarat, India. Kutch is an arid region substantially covered by salty desert and bordering
Pakistan. The villages were concentrated in the Anjar and Gandhidham blocks. According
to a 2001 government map, all villages in the study had a population below 2,000 and most
between 500 and 1,000.7 The experiment was conducted in Gujarati.
March and April are in the “hot season” of Gujarat. People believe that children are
especially susceptible to diarrhea during these months. Thirteen percent of women in my
sample with children in their household report at least one child having had a loose stool in
the previous week. This implies statistically signiﬁcantly more than the global median rate
of 3.2 episodes of diarrhea per child-year found by Kosek et al. (2003).8
Surveyors made unannounced visits to participants’ houses to conduct the experiment.
They were instructed to visit every house admissible under the experimental protocol.9 The
6Ambapar, Devaliya, Gopalnagar, Hatdi, Lakhapar, Mitha Pasvariya, Mithi Rohar, Nagavadalia, Satapur,
Tapar, Varasamedi, Veera, and Vidi.
7This is the most recent and only available map; much has changed in Kutch since a 2001 earthquake.
8It is 13 percent of women who report diarrhea, and many women have multiple children; to be conser-
vative, if each has only one child with a loose stool, 11.6 percent of children do.
3.2 episodes per year
52 weeks per year = 0.0616
episodes per week. With ¯ x = 0.116 and µ0 = 0.0616, t = 4.33.
9A house might be inadmissible if a woman declined to participate, if the surveyor could not conduct the
13experiment was conducted only with adult women; surveyors were trained not to interview
a woman if anybody other than small children were present.10 In addition to ethically pro-
moting anonymity, privacy ensured that the experiment was focused on individual decision-
making, not social preferences or signalling. A research assistant who understood English,
Hindi, and Gujarati made spot checks on the surveyors to enforce the protocol.
3.1.2 Product and prices
Participants were oﬀered a package of two 120 gram bars of Lifebuoy brand soap. Lifebuoy
is one of two brands of soap in Kutch marketed for health rather than beauty; it claims
to provide “long lasting protection from germs.” The other pro-health brand, Dettol, is
substantially more expensive by weight. A social marketing program by Hindustan Lever
Limited that sold Lifebuoy in rural Indian villages is cited enthusiastically by Easterly (2006).
Participants would have been familiar with the soap. In almost every village I found at
least three brands of soap for sale, and in most about ﬁve; Lifebuoy was regularly among
them. Yet, many participants do not generally purchase or use body soap, so its oﬀer may
require deliberation. That the soap was pre-packaged into bundles of two bars clariﬁed to
participants that they were being oﬀered the set.
Soap was oﬀered at the “low” price of 3 rupees and the “high” price of 15 rupees. Like
in previous social marketing experiments, these represent subsidies of 88 and 42 percent of
the market price and 87 and 33 percent subsidies of the lowest price of soap found in any
village. Even at 15 rupees, as table 4 shows, the soap was less expensive by weight than any
other soap found for sale in these villages. The table omits sachets, small packets of liquid
or powdered soap, shampoo, or detergent that people often buy because of their low prices,
despite very low volume; a sachet of shampoo from an experimental village cost three rupees
for eight milliliters.
Some soaps’ packages report a “toilet soap grade” of 1, 2, or 3. A 0.1 rupees-per-gram
increase in the price of the soap in my sample is associated with a 30 percentage point
increase in the linear probability of being grade 2 or 3 rather than grade 1 (s.e. = 0.148).
Lifebuoy is grade 3.
interview alone with the participant, or if the surveyor believed the participant had already witnessed or
heard about the experiment.
10In one case, a random check revealed a surveyor to be interviewing a woman with other adults present.
The surveyor explained that the other adults spoke only Kucchi and would not have understood the experi-
ment in Gujarati. Because this nevertheless may have changed the individual decision-making nature of the
experiment, all interviews by this surveyor were discarded in that cluster.
143.1.3 Thinking treatment
To determine the eﬀects of deliberation costs, I experimentally manipulated them. Partic-
ipants assigned to a treatment group were indirectly required to deliberate about whether
they should buy the soap immediately before actually being required to choose. Because
they had already deliberated, at the time of their decision marginal deliberation costs were
smaller than without the treatment, and possibly zero.
Speciﬁcally, participants in the treatment group were asked a series of questions that
appeared to be ordinary survey questions. Surveyors wrote down responses as if learning the
answers were the goal. However, these questions were in fact designed to lead participants
through deliberation about the oﬀer. Participants in the control group were asked a matched
set of irrelevant questions. Both sets of questions are reported in appendix section B.
Care was taken to equalize the duration and cognitive and emotional intensity of thinking
and control questions; balanced questions could avoid spurious eﬀects of mental depletion,
confusion, or experimenter demand. Additionally, control questions were written to avoid a
direct eﬀect on the soap decision, such as by invoking wealth or social status. Each control
question was matched to a thinking question in grammar, form of response (numerical,
comparative, or open-ended), and expected fatigue. While in English there are 123 words in
the thinking questions and 116 in the control questions, in Gujarati there are 126 and 125
words, respectively. A research assistant present for many interviews reports that among a
surveyor’s interviews, treatment and control questions took approximately the same time.
Care was also taken to avoid prejudicing the results of deliberation. For example, a ques-
tion was asked that highlighted the opportunity cost of spending p (“How much ﬂour could
you buy for p rupees?” presumably a positive amount) and another was asked demonstrating
an upper bound on this opportunity cost (“Could you buy a bucket for p rupees?”; partic-
ipants could almost certainly not). Additionally participants were asked to give a reason
buying the soap would be a good idea and a reason it would not. The order of the good and
bad reasons was randomly counterbalanced to avoid question order eﬀects, as was the order
of good and bad aspects of participants’ native villages in the control group.
To increase the probability that deliberation happened only according to the experimental
protocol, surveyors were instructed not to interview women who appeared to have already
heard about the experiment from neighbors. We visited each village only once, and conducted
interviews for no more than a few hours.
The thinking treatment is similar to “debiasing” experiments in cognitive psychology.
Fischhoﬀ (1982) describes debiasing as “destructive testing” of decision-making anomalies,
often seeking “to discover the boundary conditions for observing biases.” A common debias-
15ing technique used in this experiment’s thinking treatment is to ask participants to generate
reasons, in this case to buy the soap and not to buy the soap. Schwarz et al. (2007) warn
about the “metacognitive” eﬀects of this debiasing strategy, the eﬀects of the experience of
thinking. Their experiments show that when people have diﬃculty producing arguments for
a proposition, they tend to believe there are few. Asking a participant to list many beneﬁts
of an activity may make her less likely to select it than asking her to list fewer; the increased
diﬃculty she has ﬁnding the marginal beneﬁts persuades her that they are scarce. This is
particularly relevant to the experiment in Kucchi villages: almost half of the participants
never attended school, and even those who did found the experiment unusual. To avoid this
complication, the treatment asks for only one reason of each type.
Social psychologists have found that people are more likely to ultimately undertake ac-
tions to which they are asked to verbally commit. Making a commitment appears to change
people’s preferences by inducing them to signal to themselves that their preferences are dif-
ferent (Bem, 1967). To isolate cognitive mechanisms, the thinking treatment does not ask
participants whether they will or should buy the soap.
3.1.4 Econometric strategy
According to proposition 2 from section 2.2.1, eliminating deliberation costs should increase
take-up at a high price that falls within the range of foregone proﬁtable oﬀers, but should
have no eﬀect, or a slightly negative eﬀect, on take-up at a low price. To test this proposition,
I make two ancillary assumptions: that 15 and 3 rupees constitute such high and low prices,
and that the thinking questions eliminated marginal deliberation costs at the time of the
decision, but had no other eﬀect relative to the control questions.
With two experimentally crossed treatments, I can estimate the saturated model
buyij = β0 + β1thinkingij + β2high priceij + β3thinkingij × high priceij + εij, (5)
where buyij is a binary indicator of whether the participant bought the soap, thinkingij is a
dummy variable indicating having been assigned to the thinking treatment, and high priceij
is a dummy for a 15 rupee price. Index i identiﬁes participants; j represents the clustering
of the data.
The theory predicts:
• β1 = 0. Thinking has no eﬀect, or a slightly negative eﬀect, at three rupees.
• β2 < 0. Charging the higher price reduces take-up in the control group.
16• β3 > 0. Encouraging thinking reduces the eﬀect of the change in price by increasing
take-up at the high price.
3.2 Validity
3.2.1 Randomization balanced observable characteristics
Table 5 presents summary statistics of answers to survey questions. These few survey ques-
tions, asked in order to assess balance of experimental groups, followed the experimental
treatments and soap decision, and may have been inﬂuenced by them. Survey questions
must either precede or follow the experimental decision whether to buy soap; whichever
came second could be tainted. Rather than counterbalance their order, I chose to focus on
the validity of the experiment.
The results are unsurprising in this population. The average household has ﬁve members,
and in 85 percent at least one of these is a child. Approximately half of the participants ever
attended school and almost twenty percent live in their native village.
Fifty-ﬁve percent of participants reported in a question at the end of the interview that
they bought soap “the last time that [they] went to the market.” This high ﬁgure almost
certainly includes some experimenter demand: the question came after an experiment that
demonstrated the surveyor cares about soap and may have been a way to politely excuse not
having bought soap from the surveyor. Additionally, while surveyors were trained to specify
body and hand soap, many participants may not have distinguished laundry detergent or
sachets of shampoo, which could be bought frequently in very small quantities. Partici-
pants were not asked to show soap to surveyors but a research assistant reports that many
participants did not appear to possess soap.
My causal interpretation of the coeﬃcients in regression equation 5 is grounded in the
random assignment of treatment and control groups, stratiﬁed by cluster and surveyor.
The experiment used eight diﬀerent scripts: {3 rupees,15 rupees} × {treatment,control} ×
{good reason ﬁrst,bad reason ﬁrst}.11 Each surveyor received experimental forms in paper-
clipped packets of eight in opaque envelopes. These forms were in a random order inde-
pendent across packets,12 and numbered in green pen (so it could not be changed). Only
after participants had agreed to participate after hearing an oral consent script, and after
the surveyor was alone with a participant, was the participant assigned a script by the sur-
11As described in section 3.1.3, the order of the request for positive and negative reasons was randomized
simply to counterbalance any eﬀect of asking either ﬁrst; it was not an experimental treatment and had no
hypothesized eﬀect.
12Usually, I used a table of random digits; on one occasion I used a die to demonstrate the concept to the
surveyors, and once or twice in a pinch in the ﬁeld I shuﬄed papers and blindly pulled them out of a bag.
17veyor’s removal of the next form from the envelope. Assignment was clearly not double-blind
(surveyors knew which form they were reading), but surveyors did not know my hypotheses.
After completing a set of eight forms, surveyors returned to the jeep for a new packet from
me. Surveyors were trained not to look in the envelope at upcoming forms. A research
assistant and I intercepted surveyors throughout the day to verify their compliance with
randomization protocols.
Randomization achieved suﬃcient balance across experimental groups that no observed
characteristics statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀer. Table 5 presents means and standard errors
for each group, as well as the F statistic testing the ﬁt of a saturated model.
Although the independent variables in regression equation 5 use initial assignment, at-
trition and compliance are not problems in this experiment. Participants had a single,
approximately ten-minute interaction with surveyors. Once participants agreed to the ex-
periment and were randomly assigned a treatment group, they were counted as having not
bought the soap if the interview stopped, or under any outcome other than buying the soap.
This only happened in 3.4 percent of cases; the last row of table 5 conﬁrms that stoppage is
not diﬀerentially likely in experimental groups. Column 3 of table 6 will report that results
are robust to omitting these 22 participants.
3.2.2 The thinking treatment encouraged thinking
While the answers to the thinking questions were never intended to be part of the experiment—
asking them was the point—the surveyors were instructed to report them. The answers were
not nonsense. For example, while only 5 percent of participants oﬀered soap for three rupees
thought they could ﬁnd the same quantity at a lower price, 19 percent of those oﬀered it for
ﬁfteen rupees thought so.
Answers to thinking treatment questions proved to be associated with buying behavior.
Among the 324 participants asked, participants who believe the soap will last ten days are
5.6 percentage points more likely to buy (s.e. = 0.053), those who believe they can get a
lower price are 22.4 percentage points less likely to buy (s.e. = 0.080), and those who believe
they will need the rupees in the next ten days are 9.8 percentage points less likely to buy (s.e.
= 0.055). These suggest that participants were indeed considering the thinking questions in
deciding whether to buy.
18Table 3: Price elasticities of demand: four experiments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
deworming bednets disinfectant control treatment
Kenya Kenya Zambia Kutch Kutch
-0.69 -0.68 -0.6 -0.71 -0.54
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Deliberation costs: Proposition 2
Figure 5 reveals the main result of the experiment. In the control group 84.0 percent bought
soap when oﬀered for three rupees and 29.8 percent bought soap sold for ﬁfteen rupees.
Among those asked to deliberate, 82.4 percent bought soap for three rupees and 39.0 percent
bought soap for ﬁfteen.
Column 1 of table 6 presents this intention-to-treat result as a linear probability regres-
sion: proposition 2 is matched. The thinking treatment had almost no direct eﬀect among
those oﬀered soap for three rupees; it was associated with a statistically insigniﬁcant de-
cline in purchasing of 1.5 percentage points.13 In the control group, like in the experiments
surveyed by Holla and Kremer, the higher price caused a 54.1 percentage point decrease in
take-up. The experimental assignments interacted: while the thinking treatment had little
eﬀect at three rupees, it increased acceptance by 10.7 percentage points—or 36 percent—at
ﬁfteen rupees.
Table 3 compares these eﬀects with those from previous experiments. Its computation is
detailed in appendix section A.3. Despite being dependent on the particular prices, places,
and methods of each trial, price elasticities of demand found in Kremer and Miguel’s de-
worming, Cohen and Dupas’ bednets, and Ashraf et al.’s water disinfectant experiments
are strikingly similar to the elasticity in the Kucchi control group. The treatment group
displayed less price elasticity than found in any of these studies.
Like in Shampanier et al.’s chocolates experiment’s “forced analysis” condition, the think-
ing treatment diminished the eﬀect of a change in price.14 However, the thinking treatment
13This small decline could be sampling error, or it could reﬂect the fraction 1−π concluding the soap would
not be valuable to them. Whatever its cause, the negative sign of the thinking treatment at three rupees
makes some alternative explanations of the experiment’s results unlikely. For example, the thinking treatment
might suggest that the participant’s “guest” wants her to buy the soap; this “experimenter demand” would
be more probably eﬀective at the three rupee price of a cup of tea that might be served. Potentially twenty
percent of the population would never buy soap under any circumstances; however the possibility that the
results are driven by a ﬁxed, soap-disliking group appears unlikely in light of pilot results at lower prices
where more participants bought soap and the fact that the pattern of results remains when the sample is
split.
14The experiments are not directly comparable: unlike in their chocolates experiment, no soap was free.
19did not diminish any aﬀect attached to the low price; it had no statistical eﬀect at three
rupees. Instead it increased acceptance at the high price. Because participants oﬀered the
soap for ﬁfteen rupees had no exposure to the low price, the thinking treatment could not
have worked by encouraging cognition to outweigh positive emotion about the low price’s
bargain, Shampanier et al.’s explanation of their results.
Standard price theory, special emotion about low prices, and “behavioral” preferences
such as present bias all fail to predict β3 > 0. Theories of social preferences predict β1 > 0
(people would be more likely to buy merely to please the experimenter when doing so is
less expensive), yet ˆ β1 is statistically zero and slightly negative. Bounded rationality as
deliberation costs correctly predicts all three coeﬃcients.
Two econometric issues remain. Is the estimate of β3, the coeﬃcient on the interaction,
robust to plausible respeciﬁcations? With clustered standard errors known to produce tests
of larger than theorized size in ﬁnite samples, is the inference that β3 > 0 credible?
Column 2 of table 6 omits the last interview in each packet of eight. In principle, a
surveyor could have memorized the ﬁrst seven interviews and known with certainty which
price and treatment assignment would be next. While I have no evidence of this happening,
this could have permitted a departure from the protocol of randomly assigning the experi-
mental group only after receiving informed consent. When these interviews are omitted the
coeﬃcients are similar, indeed greater in magnitude.
Interviews that were stopped or ended in any way other than a sale of soap are counted
as the participant not having bought soap. This is both for external validity — whether a
participant acquired soap is the relevant policy question — and because early termination
could be an endogenous response to experimental treatments. As a robustness check, col-
umn 3 omits the 22 participants whose interviews ended before their soap decision. Again,
coeﬃcients are similar and the interaction is greater in magnitude.
Regression equation 5 is a saturated linear conditional expectation. Because oﬀer ac-
ceptance is binary, probit may also be appropriate, though it requires more assumptions.
Column 5 ﬁts a probit model to the regressors in column 1 and recovers similar marginal
eﬀects; again the estimate of the interaction coeﬃcient is larger in absolute value.
Columns 4 and 6 are included to demonstrate robustness. They add ﬁxed eﬀects of
villages and surveyors, within which randomization was stratiﬁed. Duﬂo et al. (2008) recom-
mend “controlling for variables not aﬀected by the treatment” when analyzing experiments.
However, Freedman (2008b) establishes that, with covariates, the estimated coeﬃcients on
experimentally assigned variables are biased in ﬁnite samples, and the coeﬃcient estimates
for regression covariates are inconsistent; Freedman (2008a) conﬁrms that bias extends to
cases with multiple randomized treatment groups. I include columns 4 and 6—where, once
20again, results are similar and stronger—as robustness checks, in case a reader expects them.
If ten percentage points is a robust point estimate of β3, can we infer that the true value
is probably positive? Given the collection of data by village, cluster robust standard errors
are necessary. Indeed ρε, the intracluster correlation of residuals, is 0.026.15 However, the
asymptotic normality of clustered estimates is achieved as the number of clusters increases.
Thirteen clusters is too few, and in ﬁnite samples clustered standard errors may be biased
downward.
Table 7 reports results of alternative inference strategies. Inﬂating standard errors and
using a t distribution with reduced degrees of freedom all result in similar p-values. While
not crucial to the result, one-sided p-values may be appropriate, as the theory predicted
β3 > 0.
Cameron et al. (2008) report Monte Carlo simulations of alternative tests for regression
coeﬃcients under clustering, including a speciﬁcation with a binary dependent variable re-
gressed on two interacted dummies. They ﬁnd that even with as few clusters or fewer than in
this experiment, inference with a wild cluster bootstrapped t distribution has empirical size
very close to its theoretical, asymptotic size.16 A bootstrapped t distribution with 10,000
draws returns one- and two-sided p values for ˆ β3 of 0.032 and 0.059.
The last two rows of table 7 present further simple tests. For each cluster ˆ βc
3 is computed
by estimating equation 5 using only data from that cluster. These 13 estimates form a
new sample of independent observations. Ibragimov and M¨ uller (forthcoming) show that if
clusters are independent and if the parameter is normally distributed in each cluster, even
with diﬀerent variances, then a t test on this sample of parameters by cluster is valid. These
conditions are met: a simulation does not reject that ˆ β3 has a normal distribution.17 A t
test on this sample of 13 rejects that the estimates of β3 are drawn from a population with
mean zero, and a non-parametric signed rank test reaches the same conclusion.
Using point estimates from the intent-to-treat regression in column 1 of table 6 and
the largest p-values found by any method conservatively and robustly ﬁnds that while the
deliberation treatment had no eﬀect at the low price, it increased acceptance by over ten
percentage points at the high price, consistent with proposition 2’s predictions.
15An ANOVA test that ρε is zero is rejected with F = 2.30. The “design eﬀect,” counterfactually assuming
equal cluster sizes, would be
q
1 + (647
13 − 1)0.026 = 1.50.
16Wild cluster bootstraps resample from residuals but randomly multiply half by −1, in this case treating
members of a cluster identically. Bootstrapping the t rather than standard errors provides an asymptotic
reﬁnement relevant for this small sample.
17I randomly selected one of the 13 clusters and simulated 1,000 estimates of β3 by uniformly randomly
assigning each observation a residual from that cluster, with replacement. Kolmogorov-Smirnov (p = 0.899),
Shapiro-Wilk (p = 0.472) and Shapiro-Francia (p = 0.377) tests all fail to reject a normal distribution.
213.3.2 Diﬀerences in wealth: Proposition 3
To maximize sample size for the experiment, I collected few survey questions and was unable
to observe wealth directly.18 The control questions asked about participants’ native villages;
because I would only have to add it to the treatment group and because I suspected it might
be informative about adult women’s wealth, I collected data on whether all participants live
in their native village.
Proposition 3 predicts that the range of foregone proﬁtable oﬀers is larger and the p∗
thinking threshold is lower for poorer people. Under the ancillary assumption that women
who live as adults in their native village are poorer on average, β3—the average eﬀect of the
treatment on the eﬀect of a higher price—should be larger for participants who live in their
native village.
Are female Kucchi villagers who live in their native village poorer? Rosenzweig and Stark
(1989) explain that, especially for women, “migration in India is... predominantly a marital
phenomenon, for which conventional employment-based explanations of migration, moti-
vated by the incentives of spatial income diﬀerentials, would appear ill-suited.”19 Married
women typically live in their husband’s native village. Therefore, the question is whether
women who marry within their village (practicing village endogamy) are poorer than women
who marry outside their village (practicing village exogamy).
I have not found data on Kutch, or even Gujarat. Rahman and Rao (2004) conclude that
“village exogamy is the norm practiced by a majority of communities in” Uttar Pradesh and
Karnataka, but is not universal (248). Bloch et al. (2004), using survey data from ﬁve rural
districts of Karnataka, a state in south India, argue that village exogamous weddings are
more expensive because signalling high status through conspicuous consumption is possible;
when marriage is within a village, there is less opportunity to change perceived status. In
their data, exogamous marriages cost about 1,600 more rupees. More expensive weddings
may be consumed by richer families.
Desai and Rao (1995) provided the data used in these studies. In analysis reported in
appendix C, I ﬁnd that adult women living in the village where they lived before marriage
belong to poorer households. The diﬀerence is large: twenty-three percent of average annual
income. This association is found with several measures of wealth and speciﬁcations. Though
it describes Uttar Pradesh and Karnataka, it indicates that women in my sample living in
18Interviews were conducted by local graduate students who were required to be ﬁnished by the start of
their examination period; I initially believed a wealth module would make the survey too long, and settled
for village endogamy as a proxy.
19Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) disagree with models arguing that richer families can aﬀord a geographically
broader search for marriage partners, instead arguing that families use marriage as insurance, so rich families
can aﬀord nearer marriages. This conclusion is empirically mixed in their results.
22their native village may indeed be poorer.
Is, then, the interaction term larger for women who still live in their native village?
Figure 6 indicates that it is. While in neither case does the thinking treatment have much
eﬀect at three rupees, at ﬁfteen rupees it has a much larger eﬀect among women who live
where they were born.
Table 8 conﬁrms this diﬀerence. Among women who are not reported to live in their
native village, the interaction term is 7.2 percentage points; among women who do, it is 29.2
percentage points. Column 3 veriﬁes that this 22 percentage point diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences is statistically distinguishable from zero. A wild cluster bootstrapped t (b =
1,500) returns one- and two-sided p-values of 0.025 and 0.056.
The experimental assignment of treatments does nothing to support my interpretation
of residence as indicating a causal eﬀect of wealth; it must be advocated with econometrics.
However, only little additional data was observed; this limits my ability to include control
variables but also conﬁrms I had little scope to search among speciﬁcations.
What counfounds may be omitted? Women who live in their native village may have
narrower exposure and therefore have been more skeptical of the soap or the surveyors in
a way that the thinking treatment helped resolve. Alternatively, they may derive more
autonomy and power from the nearness of native family. These individual diﬀerences in
exposure or power may be also associated with whether a participant ever went to school.
Adding schooling in column 4 may mitigate any bias from omitted insularity or autonomy.
The estimate of the triple diﬀerence — the diﬀerence between ˆ β
poor
3 and ˆ βrich
3 — does not
change.
Some villages may be more likely to retain those who are born there: larger villages, for
example. People who live in these villages may have diﬀerent private values for soap or be
otherwise diﬀerent in ways other than being poorer. Column 5 includes village ﬁxed eﬀects.
These are jointly signiﬁcant, but only increase the estimate of the triple diﬀerence.
In section 3.3.3 I will consider whether a woman has children and whether she reports
a child having had diarrhea in the prior week as indicators of her value for soap. These,
too, could diﬀer for those who live in their native villages, though they might over-control if
they are also caused by poverty. Additionally, though with the concerns discussed in section
3.2.1, participants were asked whether they bought soap last time they went to the market
(richer participants perhaps already have a stock of soap). Including all three as controls in
column 6 does not change the triple diﬀerence.
The interaction between the eﬀects on acceptance of the higher price and of the thinking
treatment is greater for participants reported to live in their native village than those who
23are not. If a woman’s living in her native village as an adult indicates poverty,20 this ﬁnding
is consistent with proposition 3. The interpretation of residence as wealth is supported by
the fact that controlling for plausible alternative explanations only increases the magnitude
of the estimate of the triple diﬀerence, without loss of precision.
3.3.3 Bounded rationality and screening
A consistent ﬁnding of the social marketing experiments is that higher prices do not direct
products to those who need them most, as these experiments measure need. For example,
Cohen and Dupas (2007) ﬁnd that those who buy bednets at a higher price have no more
anemia. Section 2.3 argues theoretically that deliberation costs could prevent prices from
targeting distribution to those with the highest value. Is there evidence that this occurred
in Kutch?
Figure 7 indicates that there is. I identify households with greater need for handwashing
with soap as those with children and those where the participant reports at least one child
having had a loose stool in the previous week. Like in prior experiments, where participants
experienced unmanipulated deliberation costs, in the control group those who bought the
soap at the higher price were no more likely to have children and no more likely to report
diarrhea. In the treatment group, with no marginal deliberation costs, buyers at a higher
price were needier by both measures.
Table 9 reports this result econometrically. In the treatment group, the higher price
more than doubled the proportion of buyers who reported diarrhea, increasing it by 9.8
percentage points. Among participants asked control questions, charging ﬁfteen rather then
three rupees is associated with a statistically insigniﬁcant 2.8 percentage point decline in
loose stools. Similarly, while charging a higher price is associated with only a statistically
insigniﬁcant 1.3 percentage point increase in the fraction of buyers having children in the
control group, in the treatment group it increases this fraction by 8.9 percentage points.
Columns 3 and 6 permit inference on the eﬀect of eliminating deliberation costs on the
screening eﬀect of prices as an interaction. With the sample restricted to the 382 women
who bought soap, coeﬃcient estimates are relatively imprecise. For diarrhea, wild cluster
bootstrap t (b=1,500) one- and two-sided p-values for the interaction term are 0.027 and
0.049. For having children, these p-values indicate insuﬃcient precision to rule out sampling
error: 0.23 and 0.45.
20Evidence potentially against this interpretation is that more participants living in their native village
than participants not living in their native village accepted soap for three rupees. The diﬀerence is not
statistically signiﬁcant in any comparison.
24In the control group, as in prior experiments, there is no evidence of higher prices screen-
ing buyers. Without deliberation costs, however, higher prices made soap more likely to be
bought by households where children had diarrhea, and perhaps more likely to be bought
by households with children.
4 Conclusion
A stylized but tractable model of bounded rationality as deliberation costs can explain the
ﬁndings of previous ﬁeld experiments evaluating social marketing programs. Deliberation
costs cause people to ignore potentially proﬁtable oﬀers, have eﬀects weakly increasing in
price, and can have greater eﬀects on poorer people. The model’s predictions were veriﬁed by
a ﬁeld experiment in villages of rural Kutch, India. By manipulating deliberation costs while
selling a brand of soap used in a well-publicized social marketing campaign, the experiment
identiﬁed these costs’ eﬀects.
4.1 Theoretical implications
Despite the theoretical challenges outlined by Conlisk (1996), a theory of bounded ratio-
nality can be usefully applied and make new, testable predictions. Gul and Pesendorfer
(2008) emphasize that economic models should be based in empirical evidence of observable
behavior, in the economic actions people take. Table 10 summarizes the evidence: unlike
the predictions of models of emotional responses to discounts, social preferences (as exper-
imenter demand), present bias, or standard unbounded rationality, this model’s predictions
were conﬁrmed.
Holla and Kremer (2009) recognize that cost-sharing prices are “relatively small short-
run costs;” this understandably suggests to Holla and Kremer that the ﬁndings of prior
social marketing experiments may be explained by time-inconsistent preferences. Present
biased behavior is surely widespread, and it is reasonable to suspect it here, but models
of present biased preferences may sometimes be applied to behavior better explained by
bounded rationality. Frederick (2005), Benjamin et al. (2006), and Dohmen et al. (2007) all
report evidence that cognitive ability is associated with impatience, as commonly measured.
This model can be readily applied to other domains, especially where π, the trustwor-
thiness of initial signals, is likely to be low. For example, while Ergin suggests deliberation
costs may inﬂuence shoppers’ choices of car dealerships (that is, choice sets), such costs may
lead some people to avoid contemplating a new car at all.
The results suggest that “behavioral” and non-“behavioral” economics perhaps should
25not be considered two parallel but separate lines of inquiry, with one group of scholars
focusing on “psychological” variables and another on “economic” variables such as prices
and wealth (cf. Caplin and Schotter, 2008). Whether a person buys at a price partially
depends on whether she thinks carefully about the oﬀer, which itself depends on the price.
Prices and cognition interact; among Kucchi villagers, a theorist would understand neither
without understanding them together.
4.2 Policy implications
Social marketing is popular. Neath (2006) reports of Unilever’s eﬀort that “by 2005 the
campaign had reached 18,000 villages and touched 70 million people, including 20 million
children.... Based on our experience in India, the Lifebuoy handwash programme has been
extended to Bangladesh.”
Like microentrepreneurship, cost sharing is endorsed by some because it oﬀers a market-
based solution, and by others for “homegrown” empowerment of the poor to make and fulﬁll
choices about their health and education (Shea, 2007). Certainly poverty’s diminution of
choice can be profound. But the cognitive capabilities of the rich and the poor shape—and
may limit—the beneﬁts of empowered choice (cf. Banerjee and Duﬂo, 2008).
This essay conﬁrms and contributes to explaining ﬁndings from previous experiments:
charging even small, subsidized prices for investments in human capital can markedly di-
minish adoption without screening out recipients who do not need products. While these
experiments have suggested cost sharing will not reach its policy goals in a range of con-
texts, Holla and Kremer, Deaton, and Rodrik agree that the results would be most usefully
generalized for policy-making with a theoretical explanation. If bounded rationality as de-
liberation costs indeed provides one explanation, free distribution of certain products may
be preferable to social marketing wherever people are boundedly rational.
A Proofs & computations
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3










Let two agents have w` < wh. Denote the area of the set of proﬁtable oﬀers forgone as L.
26The second claim follows by dividing the range of prices into three regions: less than p∗(w`),
between p∗(w`) and p∗(wh), and above p∗(wh).
























































Above p∗(wh), both agents’ set of foregone oﬀers have the area of a rectangle of height c
π
and width pmax − p∗(wh); therefore the third term is zero (even if pmax = ∞). In the second
term, the height of the poorer agent’s set is c
π at every price, while the richer agent’s set
has not yet achieved this maximum height; because the poorer agent’s set is wider at every
price, the second term is positive. In the ﬁrst term, at every price the height of each agent’s
set is (γ − 1)v(p,w); because vw < 0, this is higher at each price for the poorer agent and
the ﬁrst term is positive. The sum of two positive quantities and zero is positive. Thus, the
area of the set of foregone positive oﬀers is lower for the agent with more wealth.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 4




















For convergence as c → 0, ﬁx any ² > 0. For all p, ¯ xBR − ¯ x ≤ c
π. Let c∗ = π². Then, for
all c < c∗, ¯ xBR − ¯ x < ² at any p.
For convergence as π → 1, ﬁx any ² > 0 and any p. If c ≤ ², let π∗ > c
²; then, because for
all p, ¯ xBR − ¯ x < c
π, for all π > π∗ ¯ xBR − ¯ x < ². Otherwise let γ∗ =
²+v(p,w)
v(p,w) Clearly γ∗ < 1
and converges to 1 as ² becomes small. Whether bounded rationality concerns x, so γ = 1
π,
or u(·), so γ = π +(1−π)λ, γ is decreasingly converging to 1 as π increasingly converges to
1. Set π∗ such that π > π∗ implies γ > γ∗. If π > π∗, then
¯ x




and therefore p < p∗, so ¯ xBR − ¯ x < ².
27A.3 Computation of arc elasticities
Except for water disinfectant, all ﬁgures are midpoint arc elasticities (Allen and Lerner,
1934), calculated from the largest available spread of two positive prices.
• Holla and Kremer write in their table 1 that, for deworming when “charging an average
of $0.30/child for deworming medicine,” “relative to free treatment, take-up drops by 62




• About bednets, on page 9 Holla and Kremer write: “In the clinics that oﬀered free nets,
take-up was 99 percent. Relative to this rate, take-up in clinics that charged for the nets
declined at an increasing rate as prices moved from 10... to 40 Ksh... by 7.3,... and
60.5 percentage points respectively.” 10+40
(99−7.3)+(99−60.5)
60.5−7.3
40−10 = 0.384 × 1.773 = 0.681.
• For disinfectant, in table 1 Holla and Kremer report “estimated price elasticity of -0.6.”
• For this experiment’s control group, 3+15
29.8+84.0
84.0−29.8
12 = 0.1582 × 4.517 = 0.714.
• For the treatment group, 3+15
39.0+82.4
82.4−39.0
12 = 0.1483 × 3.617 = 0.536.
28B Experimental text
Number Thinking Questions Control Questions Match
What is the nearest village to
this one?
1 Will this soap last for more
than 10 days, or will it be ﬁn-
ished before that?
Will you go to x village in the
next 10 days?
1
2 Could you buy this much soap
at a lower price in the market?
Which of the two villages has
more people?
2
3 If you buy this soap, will you
buy soap the next time you go
to the market?
How would you go to x village
if you had to get there in a
hurry?
3
4 How much ﬂour could you buy
for p rupees?
Is x village less than 10 km
from here?
5
5 Could you buy a bucket for p
rupees?
How much time do you spend
cooking each day?
4
6 Will you need the p rupees for
something else in the next 10
days?
When will the rain come to
your village this year?
6
7 If you do not buy the soap,
on what will your household
spend the p rupees?
If the rain did not come this
year, what would people in
your village do?
7
What is your native village?
8 Please say one reason why tak-
ing this soap would be a good
idea for you.
Please say one reason you
would like living in your native
village.
8
9 Please say one reason why tak-
ing this soap would be a bad
idea for you.
Please say one reason you
would not like living in your
native village.
9
The translations were tested, edited, and revised many times, but they were necessarily
approximate. For example, there are no articles in Gujarati; the future conditional subjunc-
tive tense was not familiar to Kucchi villagers. Because surveyors were trained to follow the
script precisely, special care was taken to achieve simple phrasing that would be comprehen-
sible to this population.
In the thinking treatment, before asking the questions the surveyor said:
First, I would like to talk with you about soap. Washing with soap helps keep
people healthy. [A] college gave me this soap. It is my project. This package
contains 2 bars of soap. Later on, you may have the package of soap for p rupees.
It will be up to you whether you want to take the soap or not. Before you decide
29whether to take the soap, I will ask you some questions.
After the thinking questions the surveyor reminded the participant, “remember, you may
have the package of soap for p rupees.” In the control treatment, the surveyor gave no
special introduction to the control questions but read the same text (without “later on”)
after the control questions, immediately before the soap decision. Then, participants in both
treatments were asked “would you like to buy the soap now for p rupees?”. Surveyors were
trained to wait for the participant to decide and not to proceed to other survey questions
until she had reported her decision. They were further trained to not pressure participants
or interfere with participants’ decisions.
C Village endogamy and poverty
Vijayendra Rao kindly provided the data used by Bloch et al. (2004) and Rahman and
Rao (2004), which contains information on household wealth, endogamy norms, and where
wives lived before marriage (Desai and Rao, 1995).21 The data are from “ﬁve districts in
Karnataka in South India and ﬁve districts in Uttar Pradesh in the North,” and are “based
on 800 complete responses to a household survey provided by married women.... The survey,
conducted in 1995, was administered to 1,120 households, which contained 1,897 women of
reproductive age” (Rahman and Rao, 2004, 244).
Are adult women who live in the same village that they lived in before they were married
poorer than those who do not? Table 12 indicates they are. I use three measures of wealth:
total annual household income, the number of assets in a list that the household owns,22 and
whether the household owns any agricultural land. For all three measures, a woman living
in her home village is associated with her household having less wealth, a result that also
holds restricting income observations to only respondents who claimed not to be guessing.
Except in the case of owning agricultural land, the relationship is even stronger focusing
only on Uttar Pradesh, which is in the north of India and may be more similar to Gujarat.
This ﬁnding is robust to controlling for district ﬁxed eﬀects, whether the woman has ever
attended school, and whether she reports belonging to a subcaste that traditionally practices
village endogamy.
21“The survey from which these data are obtained was conducted under the supervision of Sonalde Desai
and Vijayendra Rao, under the aegis of the Institute for Social Studies Trust with a grant from the Rockefeller
Foundation. Data collection was conducted by NCAER in 1995.”
22This is a discrete count ranging from 0 to 14, to which I ﬁt a Poisson model. Case et al. (2004) uses a
similar metric (“The index of durables is simply the sum of the number of kinds of durables the household
owned.”) to measure wealth in African households.
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n = 382.
Figure 7: Screening among those who bought soap, by experimental treatment
38Table 4: Prices and weights of hand and body soap found in experimental villages
soap grade price (Rs) weight (g) Rs/g
Experiment: p` 3 3 240 0.013
Experiment: ph 3 15 240 0.063
Nima 1 7 75 0.093
Nirma: Premium 1 12 125 0.096
Nirma: Pink 1 9 92 0.098
Dyna: Lime & Aloe Vera 1 5 50 0.100
Dyna: Sandal & Saﬀron 1 5 50 0.100
Nirma: Pink 1 5 50 0.100
Dyna: Milk & Almond 1 10 100 0.100
Ruchi Health 10 100 0.100
Jo 2 12 115 0.104
Lifebuoy 3 13 120 0.108
Lifebuoy Swasthya Chetna 2 18 0.111
No. 1 1 10 90 0.111
Vatika 2 12 100 0.120
Medimix 5 40 0.125
Fair One 1 10 75 0.133
Lifebuoy 3 12 90 0.133
Vivel 2 16 116 0.138
Medimix 20 125 0.160
Lux 2 10 54 0.185
Hamam 3 17 90 0.189
Liril 2 18 75 0.240
Dettol 2 18 70 0.257
EZY 21 80 0.263






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































40Table 6: Probability of buying soap by experimental group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS probit probit
thinking -0.015 -0.037 -0.027 -0.018 -0.061 -0.079
treatment (0.039) (0.044) (0.041) (0.039) (0.158) (0.163)
higher price -0.541 -0.555 -0.564 -0.545 -1.522 -1.633
(0.041) (0.045) (0.041) (0.040) (0.150) (0.158)
interaction 0.107 0.122 0.127 0.110 0.311 0.347
(0.050) (0.056) (0.053) (0.051) (0.180) (0.189)
village F7,12 = 8629 χ2 = 3464
ﬁxed eﬀects p = 0.00 p = 0.00
surveyor F4,12 = 2.08 χ2 = 9.82
ﬁxed eﬀects p = 0.15 p = 0.04
constant 0.839 0.848 0.872 0.766 0.992 0.785
(0.040) (0.044) (0.038) (0.064) (0.164) (0.219)
n 647 576 625 647 647 647
clusters 13 13 13 13 13 13
R2 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.19 0.23
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Column 2 omits the last interview in each packet of eight.
Column 3 omits 22 participants whose interviews ended before the soap decision; otherwise, these are
counted as not buying. Probit marginal eﬀects in column 5 are -0.023, -0.536, and 0.116.
Table 7: Alternative inference strategies for β3
standard test one-sided two-sided
interaction error statistic p p
OLS, clustered standard errors




C−1 0.053 z = 2.04 0.021 0.041
t, C − 1 degrees of freedom 0.050 t12 = 2.12 0.028 0.055
t, C − K degrees of freedom 0.050 t10 = 2.12 0.030 0.060






3, OLS by cluster
t test, n = 13 0.104 0.047 t12 = 2.23 0.023 0.046























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































42Table 9: Deliberation costs and screening: linear probability of need among buyers
children’s diarrhea children in the household
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
control treatment full sample control treatment full sample
higher price -0.028 0.098 -0.028 0.013 0.089 0.013





constant 0.132 0.096 0.132 0.882 0.846 0.882
(0.025) (0.033) (0.025) (0.023) (0.028) (0.023)
n (soap buyers) 184 198 382 184 198 382
clusters 13 13 13 13 13 13
R2 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Table 10: Theories, predictions, and results
deliberation
predictions by theory β1 β2 β3 wealth screening
bounded rationality 0/- - + β3 larger for poor when c = 0
as deliberation costs
standard preferences 0 - 0 no prediction ordinarily
present-biased preferences 0 - 0 no prediction no prediction
aﬀect about low prices - - -β1 no prediction no prediction
experimenter demand + - 0/- no prediction no prediction
results 0/- - + β3 larger for poor when c = 0
Table 11: Village endogamy: sample means and standard errors
from village annual asset owns ever Uttar
village endogamy income (Rs.) count land school Pradesh
0.09 0.13 17,666 2.35 0.69 0.26 0.57
(0.01) (0.01) (589) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
n 1857 1480 1878 1891 1878 1891 1891
Data provided by Desai and Rao (1995).
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